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Abstract The Fukushima nuclear disaster is a special case: 
a major twin natural disaster (earthquake and tsunami) incited 
a large-scale technological disaster, which resulted in a 
serious nuclear accident. Because the various costs are so 
tremendous, this triple disaster has had a pervasive impact 
on all aspects of life in Japan. This article describes nuclear 
energy policy transformation in the aftermath of the Fukushim a 
disaster. The study draws on theoretical propositions of 
governance and disaster risk governance, and demonstrates 
that a vested interest perspective is important to understand-
ing the results of Japan’s energy policy before Fukushima. 
Safety, democracy, and openness were the fundamental 
principles of Japan’s nuclear energy policy when the country 
decided to diversify its energy sources in the 1950s. But these 
basic premises were undermined by the vested interests that 
controlled policy administration and implementation as the 
nuclear energy industry developed. Analysis of Japan’s recent 
nuclear energy policy transformation covers such dimensions 
as policy targets, policy issues such as safety, the fuel cycle, 
waste disposal, administrative structure, public awareness, 
and national and local policy considerations. The study identi-
fies process deficiencies in Japan’s post-Fukushima nuclear 
energy policy transformation and evaluates possible ways to 
eliminate defects through administrative reorganization and 
independent safety oversight. 
Keywords Japan, nuclear energy policy, nuclear safety, 
vested interest structure
1 Introduction
When consideration of the policy implications of the Fuku-
shima event began, there was a feeling among knowledgeable 
observers that no changes in Japan’s future nuclear energy 
policy would occur quickly. The topic was considered too 
painful and sensitive to the general public, too dangerous and 
slippery for the career of any ranking government official or 
politician to receive serious immediate attention. It was clear 
to all that before any changes to nuclear energy policy could 
be made, reconciliation with the reality of nuclear energy 
safety and restoration of public confidence in the nuclear 
power industry were essential. 
Now, less than a year and a half after the Fukushima 
disaster, a critical mass of support has started to coalesce 
around long anticipated, but not always clearly shaped, policy 
reforms in nuclear energy governance. What are those 
noteworthy developments? In chronological order, on 14 June 
2012 the Diet approved a bill establishing a new nuclear 
energy regulatory authority, which seizes the nuclear safety 
regulatory mandate from an ever powerful METI (Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry). Another significant move 
took place on June 15. Amidst a domestic and international 
anti-nuclear outcry, the government decided to restart two 
reactors in Fukui Prefecture, Oi No. 3 and No. 4 reactors 
(Figure 1), and ordered the resumption of their operations, 
thereby ending a historical period of nuclear energy-free 
contemporary Japan.
What are the implications of these two decisions? Certainl y, 
the combination of the two decisions turns the discussion 
from questioning whether Japan’s future energy is nuclear to 
one of asking what is the future of Japanese nuclear energy. A 
number of programmatic documents and regulatory acts will 
soon reveal a more precise mode for Japan’s post-Fukushima 
nuclear energy policy. Research attention will then begin to 
turn to inquiries about whether the Fukushima lessons were 







































unit 3 and 4
Figure 1. Operational status of nuclear reactors in Japan, as 
of 17 June 2012
Source: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120617b4.html.
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The rational expectation was that the profound traumatic 
experience Japan endured on and following the 11 March 
2011 natural disaster would divert the nation from the path of 
nuclear energy development. This anticipated outcome does 
not conform to reality. To explain this phenomenon it is 
essential to analyze Japanese nuclear energy policy prior 
to 2011. This exploration of the roots of Japan’s current 
nuclear energy policy draws on theoretical perspectives of 
governance and disaster risk governance. The concept of an 
embedded vested interest structure is central to understanding 
Japan’s nuclear energy policy in the past. Vested interests 
have undermined the basic principles of Japan’s nuclear 
energy policy: safety, democracy, and openness. The post-
Fukushima nuclear energy policy transformation can be inter-
preted as a policy paradigm change set off by a major external 
shock and fostered further through a process of social learn-
ing. Given the damage associated with the dominance of 
vested interests in the realm of Japanese nuclear energy policy 
(Moe 2012), it is worthwhile to examine whethe r Japan’s 
new nuclear energy policy, both as formulated and as imple-
mented, is free from the externalities associated with previous 
practice. Analysis of Japan’s nuclear energy policy transfor-
mation requires consideration of the targets to which policy is 
directed, the areas (such as safety, the open or closed nature 
of the fuel cycle, and so on) on which policy is focused, and 
the scale (national or local) at which policy debates are 
carried out. Potential ways to eliminate the influence of 
vested interests in the process of policy transformation are 
discussed. 
2 Theoretical Background
The overarching concept that illuminates understanding of 
Japan’s nuclear energy policy is governance. Two theoretical 
ideas are outlined: governance, focused on governance of 
energy in Japan, and disaster risk governance.
Government intervenes in economy, as according to 
Samuels (1987), for three kinds of reasons: (1) tactical (to 
control and maintain public law and administration); (2) stra-
tegic (to correct allocation inefficiencies and market failures); 
and (3) historical (to sustain historical and cultural traditions). 
In his comparative, cross-sectional, and historical analysis 
of energy sectors in industrial democracies, Samuels depicts 
complex interactions among market structure, centralized 
state power, developmental timing and finance, openness, 
and the nature of ruling coalitions and administrative tradi-
tions. These factors result in a commercial and competitive 
presence for the industrial state in the energy market place. 
To Samuels, electric power plays a major role in the structure 
of domestic markets. One of the principal conceptions under-
pinning Samuels’ work is the politics of reciprocal consent, 
according to which consensual process the Japanese state acts 
as a guarantor to private energy businesses, “…because its 
power in the market place is enhanced and circumscribed 
simultaneously by the routines of mutual accommodation… 
[in which] the Japanese bureaucracy does not dominate, it 
negotiates. [Unlike bureaucracies elsewhere, this results in] 
…the routinization of economic policy which the durability 
of elites and their constituencies makes possible” (Samuels 
1987, 260). 
In his seminal analysis of Japan’s rapid post-war recon-
struction, Johnson (1982) contends that industrial renaissance 
was a consequence of the efforts of a rational state plan, one 
that was determined to influence the direction and pace of 
economic development by directly intervening in the devel-
opment process, rather than relying on the uncoordinated 
influence of market forces to allocate economic resources. 
The Japanese government established social and economic 
goals with which to guide the processes of development and 
social mobilization. Industrial reconstruction was one of these 
goals. An essential prerequisite for managing the develop-
mental process was the existence of a pilot agency—MITI 
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry). The pilot 
agency was charged with task of directing the course of 
development itself, and employed and devised a range of 
policy tools to ensure that indigenous business was both 
nurtured and managed in the overall national interest. 
Drawing on institutionalism as the overall theoretical 
platform for the analysis of economic policy-making, Hall 
distinguishes his approach from the earlier forms of institu-
tionalism by proposing “…to consider the role of institutions 
located within society and the economy, as well as less formal 
organizational networks, in the determination of policy” (Hall 
1986, 20). These tenets are elaborated further in Hall’s 1993 
work on changes in economic policy. Here the author adopts 
a state-structuralist approach to analysis of the state and 
incorporates a concept of social learning to examine the prin-
cipal factors for policy change, major actors in a social learn-
ing process, and the relationship between social learning and 
the autonomy of the state. Hall defines social learning “…as 
a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy 
in response to past experiences and new information. Learn-
ing is indicated when policy changes as the result of such 
a process” (Hall 1993, 278). Policy changes are analyzed 
as regards policy instruments, instrument settings, and the 
hierarchy of goals behind policy, which Hall refers to as the 
changes of first, second, and third order. Hall maintains that 
first and second order changes to policy are the results of the 
social learning process. Drawing on Kuhn’s (1962) seminal 
work on scientific paradigms, Hall suggests that the magni-
tude of third order changes invokes the change of a policy 
paradigm itself. Preceding his examination of three order 
changes, Hall states “Policy responds less directly to social 
and economic conditions than it does to the consequences 
of past policy” (Hall 1993, 277). According to Hall, policy 
paradigms are strong and influential in policy-making and, in 
particular, in the areas involving “highly technical issues as 
well as a body of specialized knowledge,” such as energy 
policy (Hall 1993, 291).
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Understanding of Japan’s model of economic governance 
would be incomplete if its traditional practices are excluded 
from the analysis. In an analysis of amakudari,i Colignon 
and Usui (2003) hold that one of the reasons amakudari 
survives is because the central bureaucracy needs it. More 
concretely, as the central bureaucracy is small, many projects 
are outsourced to the local governments, which create 
sectionalism among the central ministries. Importantly, the 
central bureaucracy emphasises the use of industry associa-
tions and public corporations for specific projects instead 
of expanding existing ministries. MITI/METI is known for 
actively seeking advice from large business entities and even 
requiring such an interaction on a near-constant basis (Yergin 
and Stanislaw 2002). 
Given the importance of local perspectives in Japanese 
energy policy-making, reference is needed to the excellent 
analysis of issues relating to the siting of nuclear facilities 
developed by Lesbirel (1990, 1998). Drawing on the concepts 
of conflict, bargaining, and compensation as the means to 
resolve environmental disputes, Lesbirel notes that Japanese 
energy siting history highlights diversity in the structure 
of bargaining environments, power relationships, and the 
effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms. His analysis 
of energy siting processes and outcomes suggests that “in 
siting, negotiators and leaders often respond to changed 
circumstances and develop innovative approaches and strate-
gies to deal with political siting problems... [and goes on 
to say that], “Japanese leaders and negotiators… often work 
privately behind the scenes… [where] they do develop 
sophisticated strategies for dealing with highly complex 
conflictual situation” (Lesbiel 1998, 151–52).
Linking three levels of energy policy-making is the 
concept of vested interests, which is actively employed in the 
analysis of the contemporary Japanese nuclear energy policy 
(DeWit 2011b; DeWit and Kaneko 2011). Work by Moe 
(2012) is of particular interest for the analysis of the post-
Fukushima energy policy. This recent work on the Japanese 
renewable energy policy elaborates the author’s propositions 
made in his earlier volume (Moe 2007). Drawing on 
Schumpeter’s (1983) evolutionary economics where struc-
tural economic change—the key element to long-term 
economic growth and development—is described through the 
changes in the role of, and relationship between, technology 
and institutions, and Olson’s (1982) notion of interest groups 
and vested interests, which resist any kind of structural 
change, Moe (2007) proposes that in order to enable the 
destruction of old inefficient industries and promote poten-
tially promising industries the role of the state “is to ensure 
that no vested interests become so powerful and influential 
that they can effectively block the process of creative 
destruction.”ii According to Moe (2007, 23), “political con-
sensus and/or social cohesion in people make it easier to pro-
mote structural economic change, that is, making decisions 
that are in the interest of society at large, going against those 
of vested interests.”To be sure, one of the strongest impacts of 
the Fukushima event is the marked increase in theoretical and 
empirical research in the area of disaster risk governance. 
Within the body of literature on March 2011 catastrophe, 
there are works detailing geological and seismological specif-
ics of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami (Norio et al. 
2011) and characterizing parameters of the nuclear crisis 
(Sciubba 2011; Funabashi and Kitazawa 2012). These studies 
help the reader grasp the scale of the disaster (often called the 
triple disaster) that Japan faced. Another important contribu-
tion of this class of studies is the creation of awareness that 
there is no room for thinking that something is “unthinkable” 
when it comes to nature. Similarly the belief that “absolute 
safety” is attainable is proven to be an absolute myth. These 
studies establish the conviction that society must be fully 
prepared for multifaceted, complex, and cascading disasters. 
Within this trend exist interdisciplinary approaches that trans-
form disaster risk management, which tends to treat technical, 
economical, social, sociological, and psychological aspects 
separately, into disaster risk governance, which includes 
risk assessment, management, and communication as the 
key elements of comprehensive framework of governance 
(Lim 2011). Furthermore, escalating environmental change 
demands integrated disaster risk governance as the only 
approach that equips modern society against the increasing 
number and impact of disasters (Shi et al. 2010; Jaeger 2010). 
Although relatively new as an area of knowledge, disaster 
risk governance has evolved to embrace innovative approache s 
to technology, communication, scale of policy implementa-
tion (Ikeda and Nagasaka 2011), and organizational structure 
(Aoki 2010; Aoki and Rothwell 2011). 
Disaster risk theory addresses such questions as the extent 
of disaster risk governability (Kasperson 2010; Jaeger 2010), 
and the governance techniques needed to protect populations 
and places especially vulnerable to disasters, but which at the 
same time are most needed when the disaster strikes assets, 
such as critical infrastructure (Fekete 2011). There is none-
theless a growing concern that mushrooming theoretical 
insights are largely disregarded by the policy makers and 
practitioners and that an attempt to bridge the gap between 
science and decision making through the identification of the 
tasks for overcoming this tension is required (Kasperson 
2010). This study investigates the flaws of the Japanese 
nuclear energy policy as revealed by the 11 March 2011 natu-
ral disaster and nuclear accident. It identifies the dimensions 
of Japan’s nuclear energy policy transformation, assesses the 
deficiencies in the process of transformation, and outlines 
possible ways to eliminate deficiencies and improve safety 
and accountability. 
3 Japan’s Nuclear Energy Policy Before 
2011
Three main arguments used to promote nuclear energy in 
Japan. The first stressed the notion of energy security. The 
two other principal considerations emphasized economic 
costs and benefits and environment. Together, these three 
perceived positive features of nuclear energy are often 
referred to as the “3E.” 
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Japan possesses a very limited stock of domestically 
available natural resources. Despite being one of the world’s 
most developed economies, Japan is the world’s third largest 
importer of oil and the largest importer of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) and coal. Japan’s self-sufficiency in energy is very 
low. Indigenous energy sources (including nuclear energy) 
provide only 18 percent of its energy consumption. If nuclear 
energy is excluded, 96 percent of its energy is derived 
from imported sources. Logically, the nuclear energy option 
represented an effective means by which to diversify Japan’s 
sources of energy, thereby improving national energy 
security. 
Speaking in economic terms, the cost of a unit of electric-
ity generated at a nuclear power plant (NPP) was estimated 
as the lowest when compared with the cost of electricity 
produced using any other traditional or renewable source of 
energy (Matsuo, Nagatomi, and Murakami 2011). For the 
economy striving to maintain its international competitive-
ness, production cost is a considerable issue. Although the 
number of proponents of the nuclear energy cost-efficiency 
argument has declined considerably after the price of the 
Fukushima accident became known, there is still some sup-
port for nuclear energy based upon this very economic rea-
soning. Less controversial point is that the nuclear energy 
helped Japan reduce the burden of fossil fuels imports. It is 
estimate d, for instance, that because of nuclear power, Japan’s 
oil imports were lower by some 440 million barrels a year. 
This aspect gains additional importance in the light of Japan’s 
deteriorating public finance and trade balance deficit posted 
in 2011 for the first time over the last three decades. 
On the environmental front, Japan has responsibility to 
abide by its earlier commitments on the climate change 
policy. For the economy with already advanced levels of 
energy-efficiency, it is a challenging task to pursue the 
economic growth while toughening the climate policy para-
meters. Reliance on nuclear power, which had been viewed as 
rather ecologically clean option, seemed a practical solution. 
According to the Federation of Electric Power Companies 
(FEPC), for instance, nuclear power helped Japan lessen its 
annual CO2 emissions by some 14 percent. 
3.1 History of Japan’s Nuclear Energy and Policy
By 11 March 2011 Japan had one of the world’s most 
advanced commercial nuclear power programs. The nuclear 
power industry consisted of 54 reactors with the total installed 
generating capacity of around 49 GW. This made Japan 
the third largest (after the United States and France) nuclear 
power generator. Additionally, Japan had two reactors under 
construction and 12 others at different planning stages.
The Japanese electric power industry was private from 
its outset in 1882. It was only before World War II that the 
government imposed greater control over the sector (1938) 
and partially nationalized the industry (1942–1951). Private 
business also dominated the nuclear energy sector, where 
competition developed between two interest groups with 
poorly compatible interests: scientific, which was in favor of 
the development of domestic technology and was led by the 
scientific establishment; and commercial, which relied upon 
imported technology and was led by the government, 
organized business, and technocratically minded scientists. 
The history of nuclear development can be divided into six 
periods: (1) military development (1939–1945); (2) prohibi-
tion (1945–1953); (3) institutionalization (1954–1965); 
(4) take-off (1966–1979); (5) steady expansion and privatiza-
tion (1980–1994); and (6) general stagnation and decline of 
plutonium breeding from 1995 to the present (Yoshioka 
1999).
Thus, Japan started its modern nuclear research program in 
1954 (Yoshioka 2005, 2006).iii The Atomic Energy Basic Act 
was introduced in 1955, Article 2 of which says, “The 
research, development and utilization of nuclear energy shall 
be limited to peaceful purposes, shall aim at ensuring safety, 
and shall be performed independently under democratic 
administration, and the results obtained shall be made public 
so as to actively contribute to international cooperation” 
(Nuclear Safety Commission 1955).iv In 1956, the Japan 
Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) was established. Key 
governmental agencies and industry began to develop a closed 
nuclear fuel cycle through reprocessing and recycling the 
used nuclear fuel from light water reactors (LWR). In so 
doing, Japan hoped to decrease dependency on foreign 
resources. Japan’s commitment to closing the nuclear fuel 
cycle necessitated the development of certain technologies, 
such as the fast breeder reactor (FBR) and reprocessing to 
produce the fuel for use in these reactors. The adherence to 
reprocessing subsequently locked Japan into the need for 
FBRs in order to prevent the stockpiling of the reprocessed 
material—plutonium—a material usable for nuclear weapons 
production and therefore subject to stringent safeguards. 
This strategy has engaged Japan in a technological path with 
dubious economic and safety benefits.
On this account, Yoshioka (1999) attributes the path Japan 
has followed to the competition between two groups: MITI 
and the private sector and the Science and Technology Agenc y 
(STA) aligned with public research corporations such as the 
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI). The MITI 
group targeted gradual expansion of the commercial nuclear 
enterprise, mainly by importing US reactors. The STA group’s 
mission was to promote domestic research and development, 
particularly of its own FBR. Japan’s adherence to the FBR 
program (while many other countries abandoned it) is also 
explained through this very dualistic structure of competing 
interests. Depicting the STA’s motivation, Yoshioka points 
out that in a situation of uncertainty surrounding the space 
program, the STA attempted to maintain its domestic influ-
ence with the scientific community by promoting the FBR 
program.
As a consequence of the 1973 oil crisis, Japan became 
committed to developing nuclear energy. The Three Laws for 
Electric Power Resources Sites (Dengen Sanpou), namely, 
the Law for the Adjustment of Areas Adjacent to Power-
Generating Facilities, the Electric Power Development 
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Promotion Tax Law, and the Special Account Law for Electric 
Power Promotion were adopted in 1974. Together, these doc-
uments contributed to nuclear power regulatory framework 
and were especially instrumental in facilitating the siting of 
new NPPs. After 2000, increasing prices for fossil fuels and 
climate change policy targets have provided the most serious 
arguments in favor of nuclear energy. In March 2002, the 
Japanese government announced that it would increase its 
reliance on nuclear energy to achieve greenhouse gas emis-
sion reduction goals set by the Kyoto Protocol. In 2008, in the 
Cool Earth-Innovative Energy Technology Program (METI 
2008), the JAEC planned a 54 percent reduction in CO2 
emissions (from 2000 levels) by 2050, targeting a 90 percent 
reduction by 2100. This envisioned that nuclear energy would 
contribute about 60 percent of primary energy in 2100 (com-
pared with 10 percent at the time the plan was formulated). 
By March 2011, Japan had about 32 percent of electricity 
generated by NPPs and planned to increase this share to 
some 50 percent by 2030 through the construction of 14 new 
reactors (JAEC 2009).
Japan had a clear focus on nuclear power stating the four 
main objectives of the nuclear energy policy as follows: 
(1) increase nuclear power capacity as a major element of 
electricity production; (2) advance domestic recycling and 
reprocessing; (3) develop reactors designs in order to improve 
the utilization of fuel; and (4) promote nuclear energy to the 
public by emphasizing its safety.
3.2 Institutional Framework for Nuclear Power 
Regulation
Examination of nuclear policy-making in Japan demands a 
three-level analysis: regional, national, and international. 
National and regional aspects are addressed below, while only 
a few points involved with the international facet of nuclear 
policy-making in Japan are touched upon. 
Since its establishment, nuclear energy policy in Japan 
was generated by the governmental agencies and implemente d 
by the electric power industry actors and a number of public-
private institutions (Figure 2). The Japan Atomic Energy 
Commission, under the authority of the Prime Minister’s 
Office, sets national nuclear policy (The Long-Term Program 
for the Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy, LTP), 
and promotes research, development, and implementation 
of nuclear energy. The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), 
a more senior government body set up in 1978 under the 
Atomic Energy Basic Act, was responsible for formulating 
policy together with JAEC until the NSC disappeared from 
the scene in 2012. MITI (reorganized into METI in 2001) 
focused on the promotion of industrial policy, including 
nuclear policy. MITI prepared the Long-Term Energy Supply 
and Demand Outlook (choki enerugii jukyu mitoshi) and 
worked with the nuclear power industry to facilitate the 
implementation of JAEC’s LTP. The Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA) within the MITI/METI has been 
responsible for nuclear power regulation, licensing, and 
safety; it also conducted regular inspections of safety-related 
aspects of all nuclear power plants. Gradually, MITI expande d 
its influence on the matters of nuclear safety (Box 1), leaving 
the NSC to only review its actions. Also, MITI eventually 
gained control over a portion of the research and development 
of nuclear power that had been the STA’s realm; the STAv has 
effectively become a bureaucratic advisory board.
The Ministry of Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
(MEXT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) also played their respective parts 
in the development of nuclear power. The MOFA, given the 
involvement of the United States and other countries in 
Japan’s nuclear sector development, often negotiated critical 
agreements to ensure the progress of the Japanese nuclear 
industry. Meanwhile, the MOF was crucial in funding the new 
projects.
Regional projections of nuclear energy policy are mainly 
related to the NPPs’ siting. In the affairs such as land use, the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Tourism, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications are those possessing important 
jurisdiction. On the international scene, throughout the 1990s 
the construction of NPPs was additionally facilitated by 
Japan’s compliance with provisions of the US-Japan Struc-
tural Impediment Initiative. The latter imposed on Japan the 
obligation to expand its public investment, thereby confining 
the influence of the Japanese yen to the domestic market and 
preventing the devaluation of the US dollar.
3.3 Nuclear Power Politics—the Vested Interests in 
Japanese Clothes
Japanese politicians and parties are known to be less potent 
than Japan’s administrative bureaucracy, which primarily 
determines government policy. This is largely a result of one 
party—the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party)—dominance for 
nearly 40 years after 1955. Under the LDP, bureaucrats could 
produce any necessary political decision. While there are still 
the signs that many LDP Members of Parliament continue to 
represent the vested interests of particular industrial groups, 
including the power generating sector, the positions of other 
political parties and independent politicians regarding nuclear 
energy began to diverge into pro- and anti-nuclear stances 
(Jupesta and Suwa 2012).vi But energy politics is known for 
being not only a result of official and formally established 
settings (Wang and Chen 2012). There is a web of implicit 
threads woven into a fabric of nuclear energy politics. A net-
work involved with the promotion of nuclear power, a camp 
revering its unwritten rules, is known as a “nuclear village,” 
or genshiryoku mura, in Japanese. 
Traditionally, Japanese nuclear policy makers and the 
nuclear industry have been interconnected through an elabo-
rate system of rituals. An implicit process of subtle negotia-
tions and discussions involving the key actors prior to their 
official meeting, nemawashi (literally, “digging around the 
roots of a tree” before transplanting), is intended to produce 
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Figure 2. Organization chart of Japan’s nuclear power sector
an invariable consensus even in the case of persistent con-
flicts of interest. Although for the agencies assigned with one 
task it could probably be a commendable practice, in case of 
nuclear policy-making this tradition has caused great damage 
(see Boxes 2 and 3). That is, in the area of energy planning, 
the principal objectives and targets for energy policy in the 
METI’s Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook 
would customarily converge with those in the JAEC’s LTP 
for nuclear energy development. In nuclear energy safety 
regulation, the JAEC and the STA would downplay safety 
considerations after consultations with the METI. In matters 
of financial backing, the MOF would allot the funding for 
domestic research on and development of the same technolo-
gies that were readily available overseas. Flaws in adminis-
trative and regulatory routine would reproduce themselves in 
a new round of staff rotation among and between various 
“districts” of the nuclear village. 
Among the most notorious practices embedded in 
Japanese nuclear energy policy- making are amakudari 
(descent from heaven) and amaagari (accent to heaven), an 
illegal revolving door between the Japanese government and 
corporations (Wang and Chen 2012). The practice is hard to 
stop despite severe criticism from within and outside of the 
government and the government’s own regular pledges to 
weed it out. Since 2000, the power companies have sent at 
least 100 employees to central government bodies, in particu-
lar to the NSC and other offices involved in safety at NPPs. 
TEPCO, which has sent 32 workers to the government, had 
reserved seats at several positions. By the same token, 68 
former industry ministry officials with extensive nuclear 
industry oversight roles have moved to postretirement jobs 
as executive board members or advisers at 12 of the major 
power companies over the past five decades. As of 2 May 
2011, there were still 13 of these former ministry officials 
Cabinet Office 
Prime Minister
Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) 
formulates strategies for promotion of research, 
development and utilization of nuclear energy; 
coordinates activities of administrative organizations 
concerned; compiles budget for implementing NEP; etc.
Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) 
develops nuclear safety policy; formulates regulatory 
documents to assure safety of nuclear facilities and 
prevention of radiation hazards; supervision for safety 
regulation by regulating bodies;  etc.
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI / MITI)
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)
safety regulations for nuclear power facilities 
(including R&D reactors); regulations for production 
of fuel for power generation, reprocessing of spent 
fuel, and disposal of radioactive waste; etc.
Japan Electrical Manufacturers' 
Association, JEMA: Toshiba, Hitachi, 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, etc.
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE)
central role in safety regulations for industrialized 
nuclear power; responsible for regulating nuclear 
safety, drafting of safety regulations and the licensing 
of milling and refining, nuclear fuel fabrication, spent 
nuclear fuel reprocessing and storage, disposal of 
radioactive waste and decommissioning of nuclear 
power plants; etc.
Federation of Electric Power 
Companies of Japan (FEPC):
Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Hokuden
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Tohokuden
Tokyo Electric Power Co., TEPCO
Chubu Electric Power Co., Chuden
Hokuriku Electric Power Co., HEPCO
Kansai Electric Power Co., KEPCO
Chugoku Electric Power Co., CEPCO
Shikoku Electric Power Co., Yonden
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Kyuden
Okinawa Electric Power Co., Okiden
other utilities: Japan Atomic Power Co., 
JAPCO; Electric Power Development 
Company ( J-Power, EPDC) 
Ministry of of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology (MEXT) / Ministry of Education, 
Science, Sports and Culture
Science and Technology Policy 
Bureau, STPB 
nuclear policies on science and 
technology; responsible for research & 
test reactors, nuclear material use, 
radio isotope use, radiation generator 
use, environmental radioactivity 
monitoring, safeguards, etc. 





Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications
Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare, etc.
Semi-governmental: Japan Atomic Energy 
Agency, JAEA from 2005 resulted from merge 
of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute 
(JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development 
Institute (JNC) – promotion of nuclear 
technologies and nuclear energy
NGO/NPO: The Japan Atomic Industrial 
Forum,Inc. (JAIF) promotes nuclear energy 
development policy – promotes peaceful use of 
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Box 1. METI Grows Stronger
After reorganization in 2001, the new METI continued to imple-
ment energy policy on nuclear, fossil, and renewable sources. 
METI obtained a broader jurisdiction through taking charge of the 
experimental nuclear fuel cycle programs (including the controver-
sial reprocessing plant and newly proposed MOX (mixed oxide) 
fuel fabrication plant in Rokkasho, Aomori). The former STA has 
been amalgamated, together with the former Ministry of Education 
and Culture, into the new MEXT, which no longer administers the 
FBR projects (Monju and others) or Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
facilities. Authority for all of these has been shifted to the new 
METI. The JAEC became a formal part of the new Cabinet Office, 
which was an expansion of the former Prime Minister’s Office, 
while the safety regulation bureaus previously attached to STA and 
MITI were unified under the new label of Atomic Safety Bureau, 
which was annexed to METI. This bureau had 633 staff members, 
nearly doubled those of its STA and MITI predecessors. The newl y 
established Ministry of Environment had a modest role over 
nuclear issues. Environmental assessment procedure for nuclear 
power stations was almost entirely under the jurisdiction of METI. 
The country’s aggressive plutonium burning program in existing 
uranium reactors (known as “plu-thermal” program) was totally 
taken over by the METI administration (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Departments of METI involved with nuclear 
energy policy planning and nuclear energy safety regula-
tion
Source: Adopted from METI’s organizational structure chart at http://www.
meti.go.jp/english/aboutmeti/data/aOrganizatione/pdf/chart2009.pdf. 
Box 2. Records on Safety Management 
Since the 1990s, due to a series of accidents and scandals, there 
has been a deepening public concern about the safety of nuclear 
power in Japan. The accidents were at the Monj u FBR in 1995 and 
at the reprocessing plant at Tokai-mura in 1997 and again in 
1999. 
In 2002, a scandal erupted over the documentation of equip-
ment inspections at TEPCO’s (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) reactors. 
In August 2002, the government revealed that TEPCO was guilty 
of false reporting in routine inspections of its nuclear plants 
and systematic concealment of plant safety incidents. After the 
reactors were shut down for inspection, the utility admitted two 
hundred occasions of the submission of false technical data to the 
authorities between 1977 and 2002. 
In 2004, an eruption of heated steam from a burst pipe at a 
reactor run by Kansai Electric killed five workers. An investigation 
showed this pipe section was omitted from safety checklists 
and therefore has never been inspected since the plant started its 
operation.
In 2007, NISA ordered the reactor owners to check their 
records and uncover the incidents that should have been reported 
at the time but were not. This revealed other TEPCO’s accidents 
that were not reported in 2002. TEPCO reported about its 
Fukushima I-3 BWRs’ (boiling water reactors) criticality incident 
that lasted over seven hours during an outage in 1978, when 
control rods slipped out of position, and at least six emergency 
stoppages at Dai-Ichi. Kansai Electric Power Co., Chubu Electric 
Power Co., Tohoku Electric Power Co. and Hokuriku Electric 
Powe r Co. also admitted to having submitted faked safety 
records. 
Also, multiple falsifications by the utilities’ sub-contractors 
were disclosed. One such, for instance, was a cover-up case in 
a production process of a USD 250 million worth steel pressure 
vessel for TEPCO in 1975. Scrapping the damaged vessel, as the 
law required, would mean Hitachi’s bankruptcy. The vessel was 
eventually reshaped to cover the damage (it held the fuel rods 
in the core of the No. 4 reactor at Fukushima’s Dai-Ichi plant). 
Mitsuhiko Tanaka, who supervised the work at the time, filed a 
report on the case years after the Chernobyl accident. However, 
summoned to clarify the case, Hitachi denied any misdoings and 
the government did not initiate further investigations.
working at TEPCO and 10 ensconced at other power 
companies (The Yomiuri Shimbun 2011).
Another pattern of close relationship between the govern-
ment and industry is nigen taisei,vii a complex relationship 
where the government has no choice but rely on the industry 
for the implementation of the ministry’s plan. In turn, the 
government has no independent assurance that industry abides 
by the government’s plan. When conflicts of interest arise, 
they are resolved within the policy-making system, most of 
the time through the government’s splendid offerings in the 
form of subsidies or some other sort of favored treatment. 
Under this practice, for instance, METI has implemented the 
Monju FBR project in Tsuruga. Rokkasho-mura reprocessing 
plant also exemplifies this point. Recently, the continuation 
of nigen taisei has become increasingly difficult because of 
its sheer contradiction to the government’s and METI’s own 
declarations about the electric power market deregulation. 
Moreover, growing costs of reprocessing fuel and overall 
deteriorating economics of nuclear power in Japan have 
affected the sector’s attractiveness. It has grown more 
difficult for the government to get the industry engaged in the 
implementation of the plans it charts.
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Box 3. Records on Risk Management
One of the major natural hazards in Japan is earthquakes. High 
seismicity demands a particular attention to design and construc-
tion of NPP. In May 2007, revised seismic criteria were announced 
ordering the reinforcement of older plants. In July 2007, the 
Niigata Chuetsu Oki earthquake occurred on a fault close to the 
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP. Although there was no damage to 
the main parts of the plant, some leakage of radioactive water 
occurred. The investigation committee acknowledged that the 
government was responsible for approving construction of the first 
units in the 1970s in dangerous proximity to a geological fault 
line. 
Tsunami is another feature of Japan. Since 1498, there have 
been 16 tsunamis whose wave heights exceeded 10 m. These 
events happened on average once every 30 years. As the 
Fukushima accident showed, although a new inspection system 
of nuclear facilities came into effect in 2009, the utilities undertook 
no preventive measures. TEPCO’s Fukushima NPP operated on 
the assumption that the maximum height of a tsunami was 5.7 m, 
although only a few days before the March 11 tsunami TEPCO 
submitted a report that admitted the possibility of a tsunami 
wave height of up to 10.2 m. Interestingly, at the time of the NPP 
construction, TEPCO lowered the coastal cliff level by 25 m to 
make it easier to deliver the construction materials by the sea. 
While TEPCO called the 13.1 m tsunami that hit Dai-Ichi “unfore-
seeable,” the results of geological surveys in recent decades 
suggested otherwise. From 1980, there were findings that the area 
was hit by three giant tsunamis (Minoura and Nakaya 1991). The 
industry has been systematically neglecting the warnings based 
on advances in seismology (Ishibashi 2007).
Yet, old habits die hard. It has recently been revealed that 
more than 20 secret meetings between the officials from the 
JAEC (Monju operator), the Cabinet Office, METI (ANRE), 
MEXT, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., JNFL (Rokkasho operator), 
the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, and the 
representatives of the electric power industry were held 
through the end of April 2012. The government’s panel on 
basic policy for nuclear energy power headed by JAEC has 
been behind these “study meetings,” which “coincidentally” 
have convened the promoters of nuclear power exclusively. 
The prime agenda of those closed-door meetings was to 
produce recommendations for a concurrent approach to 
reprocessing and direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel, which 
could help the Rokkasho fuel reprocessing plant survive. 
Premeeting preparations were sufficiently advanced that even 
a full draft of a report on nuclear fuel cycle policy options 
was disseminated among the attendees. The Japanese media 
spurred severe public criticism of the old-fashioned decision 
making on such a critical issue and the panel was forced to 
announce the suspension of its work. 
Turning to yet another level of policy-making—local 
communities—these settings are one of the more important 
loci for the determination of nuclear energy policy. Initially, 
the Three Laws’ provisions ensured national subsidies for 
those local governments that accepted an electric power plant, 
especially when a NPP was proposed for construction in their 
jurisdiction. Not only the subsidies provided for the first 
5 years after the start of the NPP construction were an alluring 
lever. Local governments were additionally guaranteed 
receipt of local property tax paid by a NPP. Japanese local 
governments are known for their outstandingly large budgets. 
This might suggest a somewhat equal scale of significance 
between local and regional governments in the politics and 
economics of Japan. In practice, local governments are not 
as autonomous or important. San-wari jichi (30 percent 
autonomy) is a system where about 70 percent of a local 
budget’s expenditure is composed by the transfers from the 
central government. This sum, however, comes with some 
strings attached (himotsuki), which makes the central govern-
ment and the local governments inseparable (Onitsuka 2012). 
This sort of relationship to a certain degree has contributed to 
the progress of nuclear power in Japan. 
Box 4. Nuclear Power Siting
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the government was 
concerned about the means to revive devastated areas as well as 
bring growth to rural Japan. Local development was often con-
nected with NPP construction. After Oukum a town in Fukushima 
Prefecture, for instance, accepted TEPCO’s deal, its 1979 budget 
soared to 22.6 times the 1965 amount with the revenues related to 
the NPP accounting for as much as 88.5 percent of a total amount 
of tax revenues (Onitsuka 2012). This dependence has boded ill, 
however, for many of the communities who accepted the deal. An 
unfortunate consequence often involved creating an infrastructure 
and employment that could not be sustained without continued 
subsidy. For instance, Futaba decided to invite the construction of 
two more reactors in 1991, because their budget was exhausted 
and could no longer cover even the maintenance of the public 
facilities built in the first years of the nuclear revenue bonanza. 
Local communities often found themselves locked in a vicious 
circle: having opted to host a NPP, they developed a subsidy 
dependence and needed more reactors to keep their budgets 
balanced. Nuclear power addiction (genpatsu izon-shou) has 
become common.
The negotiation routinely involved the central and local 
government representatives (often governors, but also local 
government officials, fishing and agricultural cooperatives, 
and other interest groups) and industry (utilities). The gover-
nor has the ultimate power to veto a project regardless of the 
progress already achieved through negotiation with all other 
parties concerned. There were only a few cases when the local 
community called for a referendum and could influence the 
decision (Lesbirel 1998). Overall, the construction of NPPs 
has been relatively easy thanks to such Japanese features as a 
hierarchical social structure (a land lord possessing large 
piece of land could play a decisive part in striking a siting 
deal), a lack of transparency, rivalry between the communi-
ties, poverty in peripheral areas, and other special variables 
unrelated to nuclear plant design, safety, or location.
Siting a nuclear facility has been a bargaining process 
where costs and benefits were evaluated by the sides involved, 
often leading to “creative solutions and very different politi-
cal outcomes” (Lesbiel 1998, 19). On the face of it, facility 
siting has often enabled the government, utilities, and local 
communities to reach a satisfying compensation deal, the 
positive impact of which often spread into areas adjacent to 
the NPP site (donut effect phenomenon). 
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4 Nuclear Energy after Fukushima
4.1 Nuclear Energy Policy Framework
Since 11 March 2011, the Japanese government has faced 
numerous contingencies in the area of electricity supply. 
Japan’s energy policy stands to undergo a profound transition 
to cover a 30 percent chunk of electricity previously gener-
ated by NPPs. The principal decision to make is about the 
future of nuclear energy in Japan. Currently, the government 
is considering several scenarios for the ratio of nuclear-
generated electricity in the total supply by 2030. The options, 
as a percentage of Japan’s total power supply, are: zero; 
15 percent; or between 20 and 25 percent. This decision 
certainly deserves most careful consideration. 
Overall, the system of energy policy-making in Japan 
needs a reform away from a mode that caters to vested inter-
ests and toward a more transparent and socially fair policy. 
The changes involve diverse aspects and are centered on 
enforcement of energy safety, improvement of the economics 
of energy, and protection of the environment. Currently, 
Japan lives under the three-year Action Plan for Energy 
Supply-Demand Stabilization. The prime concern of the 
government is to develop and implement policies in order to 
avoid electricity shortages and prevent steep rises in energy 
tariffs. Power-saving measures (setsuden) are imposed on the 
corporate sector and households for the second summer to 
make up for the supply deficit ranging from 14.9 percent for 
KEPCO, 2.2 percent for Kyushu Electric, and 1.9 percent 
for Hokkaido Electric consumers (Kanashima 2012). This 
certainly endangers Japan’s economic recovery. Although in 
the first quarter of 2012 GDP growth was reported at 1 
percent (with an annualized rate of 4.1 percent), the Japanese 
economy currently is being kept afloat largely thanks to 
government expenditures to revive the disaster hit areas. 
In October 2011, the government published the White 
Paper on Energy Policy (METI 2011), confirming that in the 
medium- to long-range future Japan’s dependency on nuclear 
energy will be reduced as much as possible. The document 
analyzes the weaknesses of the domestic energy system and 
reflects on relevant practices outside of Japan, such as renew-
able energy policy in the EU and United States and growing 
energy demand of China, India, and other countries. The 
document states that a new energy policy is to be introduced 
in summer 2012. The basic principles of energy policy set 
forth by the Energy and Environment Council inform the plat-
form for a new energy policy, where considerations of safety 
(reduction of nuclear power use), efficiency (cost-efficient 
energy mix), and environment (commitment to climate change 
policy) are given top priority. Based on these principles, 
the JAEC in coordination with other concerned entities is 
expected to present a new nuclear energy policy (National 
Policy Unit 2011). Additionally, the Energy and Environment 
Council is tasked with the development of the Innovative 
Strategy for Energy and the Environment. 
4.2 Organizational Restructuring
Under the nuclear safety regulatory reform, a number of orga-
nizational changes are envisioned (METI 2012). The govern-
ment has eventually started to tackle the paradoxical status of 
METI within the national system of nuclear policy-making. 
Confusion often occurred over METI’s authentic role in 
nuclear energy policy: is it a promoter or a regulator of the 
nuclear sector? It has been criticized elsewhere (DeWit 2011a, 
2011b; Matanle 2011; Moe 2012) that as a renowned heavy-
weight, who crafted Japan’s industrial might, METI (MITI, 
formerly) has been directly involved with nuclear regulation 
for the purpose of utilizing technological advancements in 
the nuclear sector to trigger the development of the Japanese 
economy’s other segments. Most of the critiques contend that 
it is hard to expect the agency whose mandate is to promote 
the industry to act as an impartial safety watchdog. It also has 
been pointed out (Funabashi and Kitazawa 2012) that signifi-
cant harm was caused by placing NISA, an administrative 
body tasked to regulate nuclear power safety, under the METI 
umbrella. The ongoing structural reform aims to separate 
nuclear regulation from nuclear promotion and centralize 
regulatory duties into one agency.
Following Fukushima, a temporaryviii regulatory system 
has been established that requires the utilities to report 
the results of two-stage stress tests to NISA. Then the NSC 
verifies NISA’s findings. If a reactor’s safety is certified, the 
ministers involved discuss the decision and hold talks with 
the local political leaders of the areas hosting the nuclear 
facility in question. As of June 2012, NISA received first-
stage reports on 22 reactors (including the two Oi units 
and one Ikata reactor), but NSC has stopped reviewing the 
agency’s reports after the Oi tests expecting a new watchdog 
to take over (Nagata 2012).
On 31 January 2012, the Cabinet adopted a bill envisaging 
several steps in the direction of safety regulation reorganiza-
tion (METI 2012). The document calls for creation of a 
special nuclear safety agency, which would be established as 
an external organ of the Ministry of Environment (MOE) by 
separating the nuclear safety regulation section of NISA from 
METI and unifying relevant functions of other ministries. 
The new nuclear regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Authority (NRA), was expected to be set up by April 2012, 
but the Diet’s panel investigating the Fukushima accident 
adopted a tougher stance with regard to the agency’s status 
(The Japan Times 2012a).There has been public discussion 
and debate in the Diet about the status of the new nuclear 
safety regulatory body (JAIF 2012). The main issue is whethe r 
or not the NRA should be established as a ministerial level 
agency unifying all safety regulatory activities currently 
excecuted by various ministries/agencies (provision of Article 
3 of The National Government Organization Law) or a 
council/committee type unit set up within the Cabinet Office 
under Article 8 (The National Government 1948; JAIF 2012). 
Finally, on 20 June 2012, the Diet enacted a law to establish 
the NRA (under Article 3) from September 2012 (Figure 4). 
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Under the new system, the NSC and NISA will be abol-
ished. The former proved to be almost useless in advising 
the government during the hardest period of the Fukushima 
crisis, while the latter was too intractably involved with pro-
motion of nuclear commerce and too ineffectual in its control 
of nuclear safety activity. Both not only had institutional and 
organizational deficiencies, but also were rather poorly staffed 
and incapable of providing expert opinion and guidance on 
the contingencies of Fukushima. 
In the future, the NRA will have its own independent staff 
of 495 (mainly consisting of former NISA and MEXT offi-
cers) and a budget of 50 billion yen (about USD 611 million). 
Organizationally, the NRA and the Nuclear Safety Investiga-
tion Committee (NSIC) will operate administratively under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Environment (MOE). The 
NRA’s main office will be organized under a Director-
General for Emergency Response Measures, a Director-
General for Residents Crisis Management, and a section for 
crisis management. Also, regional emergency preparedness 
will be reinforced through Nuclear Safety Inspectors’ Offices, 
Regional Nuclear Safety Contact Officers will be dispatched 
to nuclear facilities hosting prefectures, and Environment 
and Nuclear Safety Divisions will be created in each Local 
Environment Office. The structure and function of the 
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters will be enhanced. 
The NRA is expected to act independently; its top official, 
the NRA commissioner, will have the authority to make an 
administrative decision on nuclear safety regulation, appoint 
and dismiss officials, make recommendations to relevant 
government organizations to ensure nuclear safety, and draw 
on an independent account in the national budget. Regulatory 
and safety-related functions previously implemented by other 
ministries, such as regulation of research reactors, environ-
mental radiation monitoring, radiation protection in emergen-
cies, and matters relating to nuclear security will be united in 
NRA. Crisis management is expected to be one of the most 
important roles of the NRA. 
To ensure the new agency’s independence from any 
governmental body in charge of nuclear power promotion, 
a “no return rule” will be enforced in the agency’s staffing 
policy. This rule means that top senior officials who join the 
new agency on loan from METI/NISA and MEXT will not be 
allowed to return to their original ministries. 
Also, coming under the mission of the MOE will be the 
Nuclear Safety Investigation Committee (NSIC), a council-
type, third-party body associated with NRA. This organiza-
tion is intended to ensure NRA’s independence, to review 
objectively the NRA’s effectiveness in regulatory actions and 
to investigate nuclear accidents. 
At the nuclear industry level, the Federation of Electric 
Power Companies (FEPC) announced plans to launch an 
independent organization to promote improvement of safety 
in nuclear power plants. The mission of the new organization 
is to build a network among nuclear entities, including 
nuclear plant and fuel manufacturers in Japan. It aims to work 
toward nuclear safety improvements in close cooperation 
with domestic and international organizations. It is envisioned 
that nuclear utilities will have to abide by the recommenda-
tions made by the new organization. The FEPC regards such 
a mechanism as necessary for facilitating nuclear safety 
enhancements and knowledge. 
4.3 Nuclear Safety Regulation Reform
Along with organizational restructuring, the ongoing reform 
embraces the introduction of new nuclear safety regulations 
and enhanced crisis management. One of the key concerns—
safety management—was addressed in the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster. In July 2011, NISA issued the 
Comprehensive Assessments for the Safety of Existing Power 
Reactor Facilities (NISA 2011). Also in July 2011, the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, METI, and the Minister for the Restoration 
from and Prevention of Nuclear Accident issued a Confirma-
tion of the Safety of Nuclear Power Stations in Japan. 
This document explained the procedure of Comprehensive 
Safety Assessments utilizing stress tests. The results of the 
assessments would be checked by NISA, after that they would 
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Figure 4. Adopted organization of nuclear energy regulation
Notes: “r” in arrows stands for “recommendations”; Rounded corner boxes signify changes envisioned.
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assessments, NISA received support from the Japanese 
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES). In January 
2012, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mis-
sion to Japan found the safety measures developed after 
March 2011 satisfactory (IAEA 2012).
In its December 2011 report (Cabinet Secretariat 2011), 
the Advisory Committee for Prevention of Nuclear Accident 
emphasized that the government should promote the reform 
of nuclear safety regulation based on the following principles: 
(1) separation of nuclear regulation and promotion; (2) inte-
gration of all nuclear regulation functions in one agency; 
(3) crisis management; (4) human resources development; 
(5) new safety regulations; (6) transparency; and (7) interna-
tionality.ix
The documents adopted in 2012 (Table 1) emphasize the 
importance of safety measures.
Regulatory standards and criteria for nuclear facilities 
are revised to become stricter and accident management is 
required by law. So far, such measures have been provided by 
utilities on a voluntary basis. Now comprehensive risk assess-
ment of the safety design and operation of each reactor is also 
required. The new regulations are based upon cutting-edge 
findings and the latest knowledge on safety-related matters 
developed at existing nuclear facilities. In principle, opera-
tion of power reactors will be limited to 40 years; a certain 
period of operational extension could be approved on a one-
time-only basis. Under the new regulations, nuclear operators 
will take responsibility for constantly improving the safety of 
their facilities. In this context, implementation of necessary 
measures for nuclear disaster prevention will be stipulated. 
There will be quality assurance requirements for a nuclear 
facility, not only in the operational stage, but at its design and 
construction stages. 
5 Three Stages of Transition
The post-Fukushima nuclear energy policy transformation 
has unfolded in a three-stage manner consistent with Jaeger’s 
(2010) model of entry transitions into—emergency—exit 
transitions out, and involves what Hall explained as social 
learning. The first stage was rather tough for the government, 
as the Japanese public, united by a nation-wide tragedy, 
demanded a quick, efficient, and adequate response to all the 
sufferings the disaster brought. Most of the time, the govern-
ment was unable to meet the public’s expectations. The 
public’s growing disappointment with the policy response 
was reflected in a deepening dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment itself. Grassroots activity emerged across the country 
in an attempt to address the emergency, articulate people’s 
concerns, and defend the desired future. After the emergency 
was (more or less) under control, the government set about a 
wide range of reforms. 
The beginning of the second round was relatively smooth, 
as the public viewed positively the government’s effort to 
compensate for the failures in the past. By the end of this 
round, however, when a choice between “yes” and “no” to 
nuclear energy became inevitable, policy actions began to 
be met with a mixed response. Commercially minded large 
businesses and nuclear dependant local entities favored 
reactor restarts, while a majority of the population, especially 
in the disaster hit areas, fiercely opposed the resumption. The 
second stage transformation embraced the organizational 
and legislative reforms needed to enhance nuclear safety 
management and reinforce institutional capacities for disaster 
prevention. These changes proved indispensable to the gov-
ernment to mitigate the continuing rather negative perception 
of the domestic nuclear industry (Pew Research Center 2012). 
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Although very important, these arrangements have been a 
tribute to the past, something that was established long 
before, was neglected, and imposed a very dear price on the 
entire nation. Despite the decision to restart the reactors in 
Fukui Prefecture (Box 5), this decision does not clarify the 
contour of long-term nuclear energy policy. Rather it signifies 
the beginning of the third stage of policy transformation. 
Box 5. 16 June 2012
On 16 June 2012, the Japanese government approved the 
resumption of the Oi No. 3 and No. 4 reactors owned by KEPCO. 
After March 2011, reactors were methodically put off-line for a 
periodic check and on 5 May 2012 Japan stopped the last of its 
50 operational nuclear reactors. The decision to restart was made 
on the grounds that the two Oi’s reactors had passed their stress 
tests, the Japanese economy needed more electric power in the 
light of increasing demand during the summer, and the governor 
of Fukui Prefecture hosting the Oi NPP supported the move (The 
Japan Times 2012b). The decision took place amid public discon-
tent, both domestic and international (Legewie 2012), and despite 
that a number of steps to improve the Oi NPP’s safety have not 
been implemented yet: higher seawalls against tsunami and 
coastal levees are to be completed by March 2014, enhanced 
ventilation systems by March 2016, construction of an earthquake-
resistant building to be used as an emergency operation center in 
the event of a major accident is intended by March 2016.
At this point the government needs a thorough approach to 
define, articulate, and communicate the long-term energy 
policy agenda (Prime Minister and His Cabinet 2012). In any 
scenario, the discussion of the future of nuclear energy in 
Japan will unfold across and overlap with an immense 
number of related issues, such as electricity market reform, 
the economics of renewable energy, climate change policy, 
and so on. Major organizational and regulatory reforms were 
planned for completion by April 2012, but because the issues 
of nuclear safety management and governance are so sensi-
tive to the Japanese public, and because these issues define 
the structure of the Japanese economy in the long-run, they 
require careful deliberation and take longer than initially 
expected. The changes can be presented along several 
dimensions (Table 2).
On organizational reform, there are concerns about 
whether the new agency is not a mere nameplate change and 
window dressing. Such concerns are not groundless, because 
many of the new agency’s staff members are likely to be 
transferees from NISA and NSC. It is important that the 
newly established body is free from the formerly exploited 
techniques and behavior patterns. Without a doubt, the new 
system faces a huge challenge to regain people’s faith and 
demonstrate independence from the nuclear village in matters 
of nuclear safety and security. There are other reasons to 
question whether the ongoing reform is indeed comprehen-
sive. It appears that some important functions have altogether 
elapsed during the centralization of regulatory responsibili-
ties. That is to say, safety research, formerly a prerogative of 
the JAEC, and the inspections and other safeguards designed 
to prevent the diversion of nuclear material toward the 
production of nuclear weapons, previously among the duties 
of MEXT, have not been assigned to the jurisdiction of the 
new regulatory agencies.
A number of other nuclear safety concerns arise from the 
content of the latest amendments to the Atomic Energy Basic 
Act and the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. Despite heated 
debates continuing for over one year and very intense discus-
sions held over the last decades about nuclear energy safety, 
bills drafted after the Fukushima disaster designate a 40-year 
lifespan for nuclear reactors and prescribe the implementa-
tion of “back-fit” measures that would help maintain the 
existing reactors up to the latest technological standards. 
But these bills also contained a staggering clause on “special 
exemptions” under which the reactors may be allowed to 
operate for up to 60 years. Analysis of the age structure of 
Japan’s NPP reactors clarifies why such propositions have 
been made. Out of Japan’s 54 reactors, four already have 
exceeded the 40-year limit. By 2030, 18 units, 39 percent of 
generating capacity (18,913 MW), will be older than 40 years 
and by 2050 all nuclear facilities will exceed the designated 
retirement cap (Japan Energy Economics Institute 2012).
Another key issue is the future of Japan’s closed nuclear 
fuel cycle. This decision involves heavy trade-offs (Toki 
2012). According to official estimates, it would cost 19 
trillion yen (USD 245 billion) to reuse the waste reprocessed 
at Rokkasho over 40 years. Recycling all waste fuel would 
cost 2 yen per kilowatt hour in 2030, twice as much as just 
burying it in a final repository. Overall, the nonreprocessing 
option costs represent only one fourth to one third (4.2–6.1 
trillion yen or USD 5.5–7.9 billion) of the reprocessing option 
(USD 24.7 billion). In September 2011, the JAEC estimated 
that Japan has 14,200 tons of spent fuel stored onsite at 17 
facilities. Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.’s storage facilities are 
almost full and contain a total of 2,800 tons, as of February 
2012. Several other NPPs are expected to reach maximum 
capacity over the next three years if their currently idled reac-
tors are restarted. Meanwhile, Japan Nuclear Fuel’s spent fuel 
reprocessing plant in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, has been 
halted due to a series of accidents during tests undertaken 
since the project was launched nearly 20 years ago. In 
addition, the Monju FBR in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, was 
idled for 14 years following a sodium leak in 1995, and has 
remained suspended since August 2010 because a 3.3-ton fuel 
exchange device plunged into it (The Japan Times 2012c; 
Podvig 2012). The JAEC changed its pre-Fukushima stance 
from total reprocessing to reprocessing and direct disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel if Japan’s nuclear energy reliance is set at 
15 percent. If nuclear power is completely eliminated by 
2030, JAEC recommends burying all spent fuel. 
Thus, the Japanese public has a number of concerns that 
have hardly been addressed by the government. The public 
is not satisfied with the government’s poor delivery on the 
planning of the electric energy balance (Morita 2011). Instead 
of bare statements about the necessity for reactor restarts, the 
government is expected to provide detailed and reliable 
assessments of power supply and demand across the country. 
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Table 2. Areas of energy policy transformation 
Policy Area Policy before March 11 Policy as of 24 June 2012
Nuclear safety 30-year licenses for new NPP plus unlimited 10-year 
extensions;
No earthquake/tsunami stress tests;
NSC and METI in charge of safety regulation
40-year licenses for new NPP plus one possible 20-year extension;
Mandatory earthquake/tsunami stress tests;
MOE in charge of safety regulation
Nuclear power 54 reactors, 2 under construction, 12 in the planning 
process; 
Increase of nuclear energy from 30% to 50% in 
domestic electricity production by 2030
50 commercial reactors, 2 of which are operational; no decision about 2+12 
reactors; 




Nuclear fuel chain / closed cycle; 
Rokkasho reprocessing plant and Monju FBR
Reprocessing policy to undergo change, depending on decision for nuclear power; 
Monju budget cut by 25%; enrichment restarted on 9 March 2012
Energy policy Nuclear energy is feasible means to improve energy 
security; 
Renewable discriminated (some support to photovol-
taic only, role of the New Energy and Industrial 
Technology Development Organization, NEDO)
Three pillars: energy best mix (renewable, photovoltaic, in particular), energy 
efficiency, and safe nuclear; 
Renewable energy law: feed-in tariff, law on procurement of renewable electric 
energy; Domestic means to enhance energy security (domestic gas pipeline 
system, test drilling off Niigata shore, etc.);
Reactivated resource diplomacy, in particular, with Russia (new LNG plant in 
Vladivostok, gas pipeline to Wakkanai)
Only based on these estimates can the decision be made about 
how many reactors and which exact reactors need to be 
brought back into operation. The post-Fukushima reality 
does not look particularly bright for meaningful nuclear 
policy reform. It is exceedingly difficult to break the intimate 
relationship between cohesive state nuclear regulatory agen-
cies and to succeed in preventing the vested interests from 
regaining control over the nuclear regulating agencies and 
creating institutional rigidities favoring the status quo. In 
Japan, there is no political consensus within the government, 
or even within any political party, on nuclear energy policy 
(Kiyonaga and Saito 2012), nor, as measured in opinion polls, 
is there social cohesion among the general public. Under 
these circumstances, the vested interests still look potent 
enough to counter the upbeat transition mood and deflect 
meaningful nuclear reforms.
6 Conclusion
Although the results of Japan’s nuclear energy policy transi-
tion have yet to create widespread popular conviction that 
the new energy policy promotes the hallowed 3E formula 
(national energy security, economic security, and environ-
mental security), the changes that have occurred are notice-
able. Security, which formerly has been defined more in 
political economy terms, now clearly has absorbed consider-
ations of safety. To achieve that result, the government 
revised its blueprints and prepared new policy frameworks, 
and the Diet drafted and enacted a number of new laws or 
amendments. These initiatives are intended to foster organi-
zational, administrative, and regulative reforms for disaster 
risk governance and nuclear energy safety regulation. With 
regard to economic efficiency, previous rather blurred 
statements about the need to develop renewable energy and 
deregulate the domestic electric power market have advanced 
to the implementation stage, largely due to aggravated con-
cerns about the cost and sufficiency of electric power supply 
(Ayoub and Yuji 2012, Moe 2012, Valentine 2011). A range 
of laws has been enacted recently on feed-in tariff (FIT), 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS), and power producer and 
supplier (PPS) system. Environmental aspects of energy 
policy are discussed, but these issues are often embedded 
within heated debates about the future of nuclear energy in 
Japan. At issue is whether an objective perspective on nuclear 
energy exists that includes environmental concerns. A fre-
quently heard question, framed in many guises, asks: Is 
nuclear energy relatively clean ecologically, provided safety 
is ensured, or is it overwhelmingly dirty? The simple truth is 
that the Fukushima experience has ruined the long cherished 
Japanese myth of the absolute safety of nuclear energy, and a 
new consensus has yet to emerge.
At the outset of the nuclear energy era, all Japanese agreed 
that nuclear energy must be safe, nuclear energy governance 
must be democratic, and the results of nuclear policy conduct 
must be transparent. This article shows how these principles 
were followed in the past. Systematic violation of these fun-
damentals has become a routine of policy conduct that shaped 
the way Japan’s nuclear energy industry dealt with the 2011 
disaster. Diverse shifts in nuclear safety regulation and man-
agement have been initiated in the post-Fukushima period. 
Objectively, the progress made since March 2011 in various 
dimensions of Japan’s energy policy is impressive. Despite 
the need for energy policy reform, which has been obvious 
for a long time, and despite some initial steps undertaken in 
that direction, the critical impulse for change was generated 
by an external force—the twin natural disaster and nuclear 
accident. It is important now that the Japanese government 
maintains the transition momentum so all feasible reforms 
can reinforce each other and create a genuinely comprehen-
sive, coherent, and efficient new energy policy. 
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Notes
i For more detail refer to section 3.3 of this article.
ii The term “creative destruction,” also known as “Schumpeter’s 
gale,” is most associated with Schumpeter, who introduced it in a 
book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, originally published 
in 1942. Schumpeter explicitly derived the term form from Karl 
Marx’s works and popularized it describing the disruptive process 
of transformation that accompanies economic innovations in 
business cycles.
iii This refers to purely nuclear energy research program, whilst 
research on nuclear weapons started during the WW II.
iv The amended Article 2 (approved by the Diet on 21 June 2012) 
reads, “The safe use of atomic power is aimed at contributing to the 
protection of the people’s life, health and property, environmental 
conservation and national security.” This wording, though, raised 
concerns about Japan’s potential hawkish ambitions and is most 
likely to be amended shortly.
v In 2001, the Science and Technology Agency (STA) was merged 
with the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture to 
establish the MEXT.
vi The Japan Socialist Party, for instance, traditionally supports coal 
industry and opposes the rival nuclear power sector (Lesbirel 1998), 
while within the DPJ opinions are varying from Prime Minister 
Noda’s rather moderate position to former Prime Minister Kan’s 
ultimate renunciation of nuclear energy. For the LDP see Jupesta 
and Suwa (2012).
vii While a concise and direct translation is difficult, nigen taisei 
symbolizes a government-business relationship wherein actors are 
involved in a complex interdependency characterized by internal 
conflict of interests and mutual mistrust.
viii Effective through September 2012, until the newly established 
nuclear regulatory authority starts functiong.
ix Clarifying an ambiguous wording of the principles (2) and (7). 
Principle (2) implies the consolidation and centralization of nuclear 
safety regulatory mandate in one newly designated nuclear safety 
regulatory authority, and principle (7) reflects Japan’s willingness 
for a wide-range international cooperation on the matters of nuclear 
energy safety.
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